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Jonathan Kvanvig calls this the value problem inside epistemology. ‘No, it does not.’ We might say instead that, although Smith’s circumstances are odd, in fact they render even more likely his forming the same ultimate perception together with the belief’s being true. After all, those circumstances now include the small print constituting that last belief’s being true — the small print of how it is true, particulars about Smith himself. The belief’s failing to be information is therefore not defined by its being shaped unsafely. (One might talk in that means as a end result of one might implicitly be pondering, ‘My evidence isn’t good.’) Is that concessive knowledge-attribution, as it's often known as, a contradiction? As such, the related options principle and safety-theoretic approaches are very related, both in verdict and in spirit. As within the case of a security theorist, the relevant alternatives theorist faces a problem in trying to articulate what determines which pot